Abstract
I. Introduction
The period between 1850 and the First World War saw increasingly integrated global commodity markets manifested by the narrowing of price differentials between trading partners.
That pre-war agricultural and non-agricultural prices did converge within Atlantic markets, within non-Atlantic markets, and between them has been shown in a number of recent works (Harley 1980; O'Rourke and Williamson 1999; Williamson 2002; Findlay and O'Rourke 2003) Economists have mistakenly concentrated on trade policy to explain this globalization trend prior to the First World War. Albert Imlah (1958) , for example, started his account of Pax Britannica by attributing the world trade boom to British leadership in adopting a liberal trade policy, and historical accounts have always laid great emphasis on the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. Indeed, that date has often been designated as a marker for the beginning of a free trade movement as liberal trade policies spread across Europe. However, the movement met resistance after the 1870s as countries on the Continent retreated from openness, and tariffs were raised to far higher levels in the European periphery, Latin America and the rich English-speaking offshoots. Paul Bairoch (1989: pp. 55-8) and others have shown that the rise in European tariffs was a defensive response to competition in local markets increasingly integrated into world markets by a fall in transport costs on land due to railroads and on sea due to shipping. One of the present authors has shown with collaborators that the same was true of the periphery (Coatsworth and Williamson 2002; Williamson 2003) . If global commodity markets were far better integrated just before the First World War than ever before, and if that happened in the face of rising tariff barriers, then that integration must be attributed to the fall in transport costs on land and sea.
Thus, this paper explores British tramp shipping up to 1950, an industry that carried then much of the world's ocean trade in low-value bulk commodities.
There is already much published material showing that freight rates declined precipitously before the First World War (Isserlis 1938; North 1958 North , 1965 North , 1968 Stemmer 1989; Harley 1980 Harley , 1988 Harley , 1989 Fischer and Nordvik 1986; Yasuba 1978) . This paper uses a wellknown, but incompletely mined, source (Angier) to offer a new global tramp shipping index.
Apart from offering a replacement for Isserlis, the paper also fills a gap in the interwar shipping literature, decades that saw policy-induced de-globalization. Since it was published in 1938, the Isserli index ended in 1936. Thus, it did not allow comparisons between trends in tramp shipping before and after the Second World War. Our Global Index is linked to that of David Hummels (1999) on shipping freights in the post-World War II era, so that we can say something about the very long run.
We also create route-specific deflators by using the prices of commodities transported on the route. Previous scholars have deflated their nominal freight rate indices by the SauerbeckStatist British price index, an index that includes tradables not carried on all routes and nontradables not carried on any route. Our deflated indices offer a more effective measure of the contribution of declining freight rates to commodity-price convergence across trading regions.
The first half of this paper documents our new freight rate indices for the period between 1869 and 1950. The second half explores the sources of that decline. This is a debate with an impressive pedigree. Douglass North's (1958 North's ( , 1968 productivity gains calculations in shipping surprisingly revealed that larger productivity gains took place before the introduction of the major shipping innovations of the 19 th century. North thus concluded that improvements in management and industrial organization drove the fall in freight rates, and that technological change was only secondary. Knick Harley (1988) challenged this long-accepted view by showing that there were significant problems with the North freight rate index. Basically, the early part of the 19 th century saw a sharp decline in the stowage factor (i.e. space occupied per ton) of cotton. The packing of cotton bales improved considerably with the introduction of the screw press followed by the steam press, both allowing more cotton to be crammed into holds (Harley 1988: pp. 856-9) . This led to a steep fall in cotton freight rates in the first half of the 19 th century. Since North's freight rate index was heavily weighted by cotton, it did not represent general shipping trends.
Conducting a productivity gains calculation on a revised index, Harley concluded that the more significant productivity gains took place after 1869, and were attributable to the introduction of the steam engine and improvements in hull technology. The conventional history was reclaimed.
While Harley appeared to have settled one debate, 1 he created another by noting that the shipping industry was marked by joint-production on different legs of journeys (Harley 1985; 1988; 1990) . Calculating TFP gains without taking into account joint-production could lead to a significant measurement bias the size and direction of which would depend on the shipping route. After analyzing the joint-production issue, we revisit Harley's measurement of TFP gains between 1870 and 1896. Using the price-dual method and new indices for factor prices, we calculate productivity gains for this period anew, not only for the Bombay-UK route examined by
Harley but also for four other routes. We then move on to calculate TFP growth for the period between the early 1890s and the First World War, as well as that between the two World Wars, the latter having received relatively little attention in the shipping literature. 2 Finally, we explore the sources of that productivity experience. Harley (1971; 1972; 1973) has already dealt with the diffusion of steam and metallurgical development in shipping in the late 19 th century, but little work has been done comparing the application of such technology across routes. We address the trade-offs between ship size, speed and cost. In explaining the sources of productivity growth in the late 19 th century, we also identify what these trade-offs 1 Harley was not alone. Yasukichi Yasuba (1978) calculated productivity gains in Japanese pre-WWII tramp and liner shipping using quantities of outputs and inputs, and Walter Knauerhause (1968) did the same for labor productivity on German liners in the 1870s and 1880s. 2 Data limitations force us to restrict our calculations to the British tramp shipping industry, almost entirely ignoring the liner shipping industry. Liners, unlike tramps, operate on fixed time schedules on fixed routes. Tramps are hired to carry either restricted (i.e. specified in the contract) or unrestricted cargoes between negotiated ports, and unless a fixed time charter is negotiated, no time schedule or route is fixed. Tramp shipping dominated trade in commodities. In 1909, a Royal commission found that tramps made up 70-80% of total tonnage, so that liners could not have been more than one-third of the total (Pollard and Robertson 1979: p. 20) . Liners did not operate on full capacity, and carried high value articles that were less bulky. Tramps carried the high bulk, low value staples.
meant for tramp shipping on individual routes. We then turn to the technological slowdown after 1918.
II. Freight Rate Indices
The Need for New Indices
The Isserlis freight rate index has remained the standard source on global freight rates for 1869-1936 even though its construction is flawed. The flaws are more than those pointed out by
Yasukichi Yasuba who argued that there is an upward bias in the Isserlis index since "declining rates were quoted only after the number of contracts reaches a certain level, and rising rates for the old established routes tend to remain in the list longer than they deserve" (Yasuba 1978: p. 13 ). Isserlis took his data from Angier's annual reports on British shipping, and it is true that Angier's choice of which freight rates to report was somewhat ad hoc. The more troubling problem with the Isserlis index, however, lies with the way the data were aggregated.
Isserlis used Angier's data to form the ratio of the freight rate on each commodity-route to the freight rate on that commodity-route in the immediately previous year. He then took the arithmetic average of all available freight rate ratios for each pair of years, using them to form his global freight chain index. He rebased this chain index in a single year, 1869, using the cumulative product of index values from the global freight chain index. This method of construction invokes large sample properties for relatively small samples and assumes that the sample is representative of global shipping. Basing the index on a single year after having aggregated the ratios in this way requires the implausible assumption that freight rates across regions moved in lock-step with each other.
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The Angier Data
Isserlis reports in an appendix the ratio of the simple average of the highest and lowest freight rates for a commodity-route in that year to the same average for that commodity-route in the immediately previous year. This ratio is not available for all routes and for all years, and the number of gaps in the Isserlis data far outnumber the number of observations. In fact, for almost every commodity-route, it is impossible to judge the level of freight rates relative to 1869. To do so, we would need the nominal freight rates themselves, and while they are not in Isserlis, they can be found in Isserlis' sources. The Angier annual reports included tables of highest and lowest
British tramp shipping freight rates for various commodity-routes, and these were compiled in
Fifty Year Freights (Angier 1920) . From the 1880s onwards, they were published annually in a January edition of Fairplay magazine, a leading British shipping journal. While Isserlis stops with 1936, the Angier-based freight index can be extended to 1950, which we do in this paper.
Furthermore, while the Angier reports end there, Fairplay continued to include its own reports on tramp shipping, at least until 1962. These data make it possible to link our index to the modern era (Hummels 1999) .
Mining these sources, we were able to find freight rates for over 500 commodity-routes from all over the world, but mostly for trade between Europe and the rest of the world, on both homeward and outbound routes. True to the nature of tramp shipping, the freight rates reported are for low-value bulk commodities. Most of the rates were reported in shillings/pence per ton.
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Nowhere does Angier make clear why he decided to report certain commodity-routes, though in some cases he does mention that not enough charter parties were reported to him to be 3 There are over 8,000 observations. For some commodities, freight rates were reported per 40 cubic feet, though in early years, their freight rates were reported per ton. Where freight rates were not reported per ton, we were able to turn to sources on stowage factors (i.e., the space occupied per ton) from the period to standardize these freight rates. For some commodity-routes (particularly Black Sea grain routes, Newcastle coal routes in the early years, or the timber routes, freight rates were reported in region-specific or tradespecific unites. These too were standardized by combing through Angier's reports, the contemporary shipping literature, and the Oxford dictionary. able to note the highest and lowest freight rates for the year. We are left to guess that Angier reported only the commodity-routes he thought were important to British tramp shipping.
Finally, we note what Angier almost entirely left out: the short range trade between Britain and continental Europe, and shipping between non-European ports. Thus, we cannot be certain that any index based upon this database is representative of global shipping. At best, the index documents trends in freight rates on bulk commodities between the European center and the periphery.
Construction of the New Indices
Given that the commodity-routes included in Angier keep changing, and that the series have intermittent gaps, it is impossible to aggregate these data directly to form an index of long distance tramp shipping freight rates, but an indirect strategy seems to work: construct indices for outbound and homeward trade between Europe and individual regions, 4 and then aggregate these indices into a final "global" index. These route indices are, of course, themselves useful for analyzing the development of trade between various parts of the periphery and Europe.
Before describing the construction of these route indices, we need to say a word about a technological constraint that must be taken into account in the construction of our freight indices. Harley (1990: pp. 157-8) The First World War saw freight rates peak for the Atlantic routes. They fell slowly in the interwar period. It was only around 1933/4 that nominal freight rates reached their pre-war levels, but they rose again with the onset of the Second World War.
Coal freight rates (Table 1) do not seem to have been correlated with distance either.
Bombay coal freights, for example, fell much faster than Colombo coal freight rates before 1884, even though Colombo was only slightly farther away from Britain than Bombay. Outbound coal freights from Britain seem to have fallen drastically in the interwar period, unlike homeward freight rates.
Homeward freight rates for non-Atlantic routes (Table 2) fell precipitously between 1869 and 1884. Particularly noteworthy were grain freights from Black Sea ports, that fell by over 60%. Freight rates for western Indian and Bay of Bengal ports fell by over 40% in this period.
Unlike timber on the Atlantic routes, freight rates on lighter commodities that did not exhaust both buoyancy and space actually fared better that freight rates for commodities with stowage -10 -factors similar to grain. Freight indices for lighter cargoes such as jute transported from the Bay of Bengal fell by over 65%, although it is unclear how much of this fall was actually caused by better packing. For Southeast Asia, where the diffusion of steam technology in shipping was slower because of distance, freight rates fell much more slowly than for India. After 1884, however, the freight indices for these routes mirror each other for similar types of commodities.
Freight rates fell by up to 25% before the First World War. As in the Atlantic homeward routes, freight rates fell gradually from their wartime heights in the interwar period.
Real Freight Rate Indices
In order to deflate these nominal indices, we, like other scholars, turn first to the Sauerbeck index. But the Sauerbeck index is imperfect for the purpose of measuring the contribution of declining freight rates to commodity price convergence between trading locations since it includes non-tradables and many tradables not carried on all routes. As an alternative, we construct route-specific deflators by taking the unweighted average of the prices of the commodities included in the commodity-routes. 9 The commodity-deflated and the Sauerbeckdeflated real indices are both presented in an Appendix 2 to this paper (see footnote 8).
Figures 2A and 2B illustrate the impact of the deflators by plotting both real indices for two cases: the American wheat trade and the Calcutta jute trade. The Calcutta nominal freight rate index deflated by jute prices fell faster after 1873 than the same index deflated by Sauerbeck. The difference between the commodity-deflated and Sauerbeck-deflated indices is less pronounced in the ENA-grain route, perhaps because wheat prices get a large weight in the Sauerbeck index.
9 Our deflation method is consistent with what has become common in the transport literature on the half century since 1950. See Hummels (1999) .
Extending the Global Index to 1997
Looking at the modern era, David Hummels (1999) reports the Norwegian Shipping News global freight rate index for tramp charters starting in 1947. Figure 3 and Table 3 use this to link our series with that of Hummels, making it possible to plot global nominal freight rates for the 127-year period between 1870 and 1997. 10 The nominal freight rates seem to trace out a Ushaped pattern. In Figure 4 , the trend in real tramp freight rates is documented for the 127-years.
The period between 1870 and 1914 saw an almost uninterrupted fall in shipping costs relative to the prices of the commodities carried along almost all routes; the war and interwar years were ones of great instability and little downward trend; and the half century since were years of stability and no downward trend. Hummels (1999: p. 12 ) blames the post-World War II increase in nominal freight rates on the rise in factor prices. The sharp rise in the 1970s ( Figure 3 ) was, no doubt, related to the dramatic quadrupling in oil prices at that time, but other major inputs also recorded a 10-30% rise. A 1977 UNCTAD report claimed that even port costs were rising due to mushrooming labor costs and other cost pressures (Hummels 1999: p. 13 ). Of course, tramp shipping had to deal with rising input costs before 1950 too, and the real indices in Figure 4 are, after all, deflated by commodity prices. The key, therefore, to long run trends in freight rates was and is total factor productivity growth. Any retardation in the fall in freight rates plotted in Figure 4 must reflect a slow down in the rate of productivity advance.
III. Total Factor Productivity Growth The Problem of Joint Production
The assumption of long run Marshallian competitive equilibrium, whereby the average freight charge is equal to the average cost of the journey, allowed North to write total factor productivity growth as
where A is total factor productivity, Pi is an index of factor prices weighted by factor shares, Pf is the freight rate index, Q is the quantity index of outputs (i.e. amount of goods carried), and Qi is an index of the quantities of various inputs weighted by factor input shares, and the * superscript denotes rates of change.
North's assumption is reasonable, given the competitive nature of tramp shipping. The fact that shipping and ship building were relatively small players in the markets for labor, capital, metal and machinery also supports the assumption that factor prices were exogenous to this industry. However, and following Harley's suggestions (1988; 1985; 1990) , we depart from North's additional assumption that joint production along outward and homeward routes did not matter. Since freight rates carried on each leg were often interdependent, average freight rates did not always equal average total costs on individual journey legs. Productivity gains calculated only on a single leg are likely, therefore, to be incorrect.
The existence of shipping capacity in one direction automatically creates shipping capacity in the other since ships return to their homeports for repairs and to return their crews.
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As long as the demand for ship space and costs associated with running the ship on both legs of the journey were the same, freight rates would also be the same. The assumption of similar costs is, however, unrealistic. In the 19 th and early 20 th centuries, Britain was the primary supplier of the world's coal used as bunker fuel, and the cost of bunker coal thus increased with distance from Britain. Fuel costs on the voyage back to Britain were higher than on the outbound voyage.
Crew costs were also usually different on the two legs. Lewis Fischer (1989) has claimed that the markets for able-bodied seamen in northern European ports were not well integrated, and that seamen earned more if they were hired at major ports, such as Liverpool. There is also ample evidence that Indian seamen on British ships earned less than their European counterparts. Indian seamen formed a substantial portion of the British shipping labor force, as high as 20%.
Potentially, ships could lower marginal costs by hiring in lower-wage ports en route or at their destination. Likewise, ships and crewmembers could agree to part company at low-wage ports of call along the journey.
More importantly, if demand for shipping space on one leg of the journey exceeded demand on the other, and if ships engaged on that leg until the rate there fell to equal the cost of production on that leg alone, there would be excess capacity on the return leg. Competition for return cargo among the ships that had carried the outward cargo would result in freight rates that failed to cover the cost of production on the return voyage. Thus, competitive equilibrium saw to it that tramps charged rates based on the voyage as a whole.
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In the long run, ship owners would want to use their ships with "optimal" qualities fitting the specification of the trade and the route so that the cost of operation would be minimized.
Costs included the interest paid on the price of the ship. Larger, faster and more specialized ships were more expensive to build. The literature suggests that this trade-off often saw tramp ship owners purchasing ships that were not entirely top-of-the-line, but of medium sizes and moderate speeds, with few or no special fittings for particular trades. The ship-building industry, itself an extremely competitive industry, contributed to this trend by churning out medium-sized steamers in anticipation of demand, and these were sold at prices much lower than those of made-to-order vessels (Pollard and Robertson 1979: p. 20) . It was thus possible by the 1930s for the tramp ship owner to describe an "ideal" tramp ship as a medium-sized, moderate speed nondescript jack-ofall trades steamer with no special fittings for any particular type of trade (Sturmey 1962: p. 35 ).
How the trade-off between speed, size and cost was played out in tramp shipping on various routes is further explored in Section IV.
The analysis of joint production along two legs can, of course, be extended to journeys with more than one leg, as long as the condition holds that the supply of shipping space in one leg implies a supply of shipping space in another leg. Thus, economic profits on a tramp journey from Britain, dropping off coal at Suez, traveling in ballast over the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea to Bombay, and traveling back to Britain with a cargo of general goods would be zero in long run competitive equilibrium, just as they would be zero if the coal were to be carried through Suez and dropped off in Bombay instead. The freight rate on the homeward route from Bombay would have to be the same no matter which route was taken to get there. The freight rate on coal to Suez and the average cost of traveling in ballast from Suez to Bombay would have to equal the freight rate on coal to Bombay.
There was another kind of joint production relevant in this period (Harley 1990) . Freight rates were determined jointly not only on the different legs of the journey, but also for different commodities carried on any single leg of a voyage. This jointness arose because of the disparity between bulk and weight of different commodities and the limitations of navigational technology in this period that required buoyancy to be filled.
Freight rate, and thus productivity gain, calculations should control for a mixture of commodities as well as for a mixture of legs (Harley 1990: p. 158 ). Calculations of productivity homeward cargo would equal the average total cost of the round trip less the marginal cost of carrying outbound cargo. Total costs of the journey would have still equaled total revenue.
gains that do not take into account both types of jointness of production could be misleading. If the index for a particular leg of a voyage were used in calculating productivity gains, and if freight rates on that leg fell faster than freight rates on the journey taken as a whole, productivity gains would be overstated. Similarly, if freight rates on the individual good fell much faster than on other commodities, productivity gains would be overstated.
It is difficult to adjust for the second kind of joint production simply because the interrelationships among different cargoes were so complex. Luckily, on the routes where freight rates for different commodities were interrelated, we are often able to isolate time series of freight rates that were determined independently. In the case of the North Atlantic trade, where joint production of the second kind were particularly important, Angier's data present us with a series of charter party freight rates charged by tramp steamers that carried only grain to Europe. No adjustment is necessary in this case for the second type of joint production. Our productivity gains results for the Baltic, however, require the disclaimer that joint-production of grain freights with timber freights were not taken into account.
The first type of joint production between different legs of the journey is easy to accommodate. As long as there is no joint production of the second type, the sum of freight rates per unit weight or space would equal the sum of marginal costs of the different legs of the journey. Thus, even though the individual freight rates on individual legs of the journey do not equal the marginal cost associated with undertaking the voyage on that leg, freight rates on the voyage taken as a whole do equal the average total cost of the voyage. We add outbound coal freights (per ton) to the freight rate (per ton) on the homeward journey on that route for a commodity with stowage factors similar to grain. This sum should equal the average total cost of the journey in long run competitive equilibrium.
Total Factor Productivity Growth
Harley (1988) calculates productivity gains on the UK-Bombay route for the outbound coal trade and the inbound general goods trade and thus implicitly confronts the joint-production problem raised above. 13 First, we redid Harley's calculations for the period between 1871-3 and 1887-9 using much improved factor price data, in particular new wage and coal price data (Appendix 3: see footnote 8). Second, we extended the calculations to 1909-11. Third, and in order to increase generality, we added TFP growth measurements for three other routes -UKEast Coast of North America, UK-Alexandria and UK-Riga -again using data for outbound coal freights and inbound bulk commodities with stowage factors similar to that of grain. The pre-war TFP growth results are summarized in Table 4 .
Between 1871/3 and 1887/9, 50-65% of the fall in nominal freight rates can be explained by the decline in nominal factor prices. Falling ship prices, driven by the introduction of cheap iron hulls and productivity gains in the shipbuilding industry, resulted in around 25-35% of the fall in freight rates. Productivity gains in the coal industry no doubt contributed to the fall in coal prices, but the decline in shipping costs also meant that Welsh bunker coal picked up at nonBritish ports was getting cheaper. Productivity gains in the shipping industry account for the rest of the fall in freight rates (35-50%).
These productivity estimates differ from Harley's. Harley estimates annual TFP growth for the Bombay route between 1873/4 and 1890/1 to have been 3.1%, while we estimate a more modest, and perhaps more plausible, 1.6%. Part of the difference can be attributed to the fact that our freight rate index falls less steeply, and this fact can be explained mainly by Harley's inclusion of the unusual years 1874 and 1890 in his calculation. We elected to choose less unusual end point years since 1874 saw freight rates spike upward to a half-decade high, while 1890 saw freight rates collapse to their lowest.
14 Productivity growth rates on our other three sampled routes were lower than those on the Bombay route. TFP growth along the ENA and Alexandria routes were the lowest of the four presented in Table 4 . The probable explanation is that these two routes had already absorbed the new changes in steam technology and thus they are likely to have recorded higher TFP growth rates in the 1860s and early 1870s; after all, steam technology was well established in the transatlantic trade by the early 1870s. Alexandria also had been early in adopting the steamship since the new technology was not susceptible to variable Mediterranean winds. In contrast, the Bombay route introduced the steamship only with the construction of the Suez Canal in 1869.
Naturally, the adoption of the new technology saw higher subsequent productivity gains along the route.
The Riga route, though closer to Britain, was slower in adopting the new shipping technology than were either the ENA and Alexandria routes. The route had long been known as a backwater for older and slower vessels, but the gap between the mean age of the British fleet and the age of British ships in the Baltic was narrowing in the 1870s and 1880s, and by the start of the 1880s, the majority of the Baltic timber trade was carried on steamships (Fischer and Nordvik 1987: pp. 103-5) . Thus steam technology came on in a rush during the 1870s and 1880s, and this fact contributed to the rapid TFP gains along the Riga route, much like those along the Bombay route.
Average export prices for British coal were increasing between 1887/9 and 1909/11, and on the shorter routes such as the Baltic and the Mediterranean, coal freight rates did not fall quickly enough to override the rise in "world" coal prices. The cost of bunker fuel at foreign ports along these routes thus increased, retarding the fall in freight rates especially on the Riga and 14 To avoid biasing our results through our choice of end points, we use three-year averages of freight rate indices and factor prices in our calculations.
Alexandria routes. For the ENA and Bombay routes, coal freights fell fast enough to overcome the rise in "world" coal prices. Along the Bombay route, the fall in the price of bunker fuel contributed to about 10% of the fall in freight rates. Along the ENA route, the effect of coal prices was negligible.
Declining ship prices induced a similar fall in freight rates in both periods. During this second period, however, there is also a wider variation of TFP growth among routes. Continued high productivity in the Baltic can partially be explained by continued diffusion of steam technology along the route: while other routes had gone over to steam almost entirely by the 1890s, about 20% of Baltic ships trading in timber were still powered by sail even at the turn of the century (Fischer and Nordvik 1987: p. 105 ). For other routes, it is more difficult to make the argument that these big productivity gains were a function of the diffusion of steam technology.
The old transatlantic route underwent an acceleration in TFP growth between 1871/3-1887/9 and 1887/9-1909/11, achieving TFP growth rates similar to those along the Bombay route, where rates had been maintained. These results confirm that the fall in global freight rates between 1869 and 1913, reported in Figures 3 and 4 , can be attributed to high TFP growth rates across all routes
The availability of outbound coal freight rates for Alexandria and North America make it possible to extend these calculations up to 1932-4, immediately prior to the introduction of government regulations in 1935 that aimed at limiting competition in tramp shipping (Sturmey 1962: p. 110 
IV. Explaining Productivity Gains
The revolution in shipping technology has been recounted many times (e.g. Pollard and 
Ship Size
We also use the ACSP data to estimate the increase in ship size along various routes. Again dividing the period between 1869 and 1913 into 9 five-year periods, we regress ship size on period, controlling for regions. The regional coefficients on all but West Africa are statistically significant. Furthermore, average ship size increased over time on all routes. There were, of course, pronounced regional differences, with the largest ships being used in the North Atlantic trade. 17 Larger ships were also used along South African and Australian routes. In the Baltic and Spanish trades, smaller vessels were used, lending support to the contemporary literature's description of the former as a backwater for older vessels. 16 Crew sizes differed somewhat by route, as contemporary accounts inform us. Certainly the composition of the crew differed by route. A large segment of the British tramp ship labor force was comprised of Asians (known as "lascars" in contemporary accounts) from South and Southeast Asia, hired primarily on Indian ocean routes because they were better able to withstand the tropical heat. However, a crew size regression with regional controls was not statistically significant. 17 Harley (1989: pp. 153-4) According to Harley, the ratio increased from 5 in 1875 to 6 in 1885. Cage (1997: pp. 150-60) reports that "typical" tramp steamers of around 4000 gross registered tons bought by Burrell & Sons of Glasgow around 1910 carried engines of about 300-320 NHP. The Hughes (1917: p. 310) handbook, a well-respected shipping manual of the period, estimates that the IHP on the typical ship was around 2000. All of this implies that the ratio of IHP to NHP stood at a bit less than 7 in
1913.
Engine volume for 1869-1913 can also be estimated from the ACSP data by regressing it on gross tonnage, period and square of period. The results are statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval. Engine volumes decreased over time, but increased with ship size, implying that improved engine technology and fuel efficiency allowed a tradeoff between smaller engines and larger ships.
Time Spent at Sea
ACSP data reporting days at sea per gross ton were regressed on period, period squared, gross tonnage, horsepower per gross ton and the number of ports visited along the way. The results
showed that days at sea per gross ton fell with increasing ship size, implying economies of scale.
However, time spent at sea was not falling, holding ship size constant. Along the ENA route, the coefficient on the period variable was positive and significant. Along the Alexandria route, the positive coefficient on the period-squared variable was so large that days at sea per gross ton actually increased by the second period. For the Riga and Bombay routes, the positive coefficient on the period-squared variable was large enough for days spent at sea per gross ton to be increasing up to 1914. Days spent at sea per gross ton would have been decreasing over time only if speed was chosen over ship size. For a route such as ENA, where tramp ships would have to compete with larger liner vessels, it seems that larger ships were always chosen. Voyage charter parties did not stipulate fixed routes or schedules for hired tramp vessels. This implies that there was no premium for speed in the tramp shipping business, which carried mostly low value commodities. Clearly, ship owners would lean toward size rather than speed, as the data confirm for the other routes.
Port Turnaround Times
The ACSP data were also used to determine by regression time at port. Days in port per gross ton decreased with increasing ship size, implying economies of scale. However, for the port of Antwerp, the coefficient on the period variable was positive. For Bombay, Alexandria and Riga, the period-squared variable was positive, and large enough for time at port per gross ton to be increasing by the fourth period, implying that technology may not have kept up with the increasing volume of trade at every port.
Explaining TFP Growth in the Age of Steam
The ACSP data allow us to say something about the components of productivity growth during the age of steam. True, the total factor productivity growth implied by the ACSP data in Table 6 does not always reproduce the calculations of the previous section, but we only use Table   6 to identify which forces accounted for most of the pre-war productivity advance along four major routes, not to get another estimate of aggregate TFP growth.
In the first two decades (1871/3-1887/9), increasing ship size contributed significantly to total factor productivity growth, ranging from about a quarter along the Bombay route to about a -24 -third along the ENA and Alexandria routes. Increasing ship size contributed to about half of TFP growth along the Riga route. We have already alluded to the increase in vessel size along Baltic routes as ship size converged to the British fleet average, and Table 6 confirms its importance to TFP growth. The increase in load capacity contributed about the same to the increase in productivity. This was particularly true of the ENA route (60.9%), where vessels were so much larger. Scale economies made possible reductions in crew size, a force that accounted for a tenth to almost a third of productivity growth. As predicted, the strongest effect (33.6%) was along the ENA route, plied as it was by the largest ships.
There seems to have been a tradeoff between size and speed along some routes, particularly ENA. For Bombay, the sharp decline in voyage time was no doubt facilitated by faster passages through the Suez Canal. The fact that coal consumption decreased along this route, supports this hypothesis. Had speeds increased at the rate that would have created the observed drop in voyage time, coal consumption would likely have increased. Decreasing coal consumption on all routes contributed to about a tenth of the productivity increases in this period.
In any case, the big surprise is the major decrease in port turnaround times. For the Bombay and Alexandria routes, its contribution to productivity growth was almost as high as the direct effect of the increase in ship size.
For the second two decades (1887/9-1909/11), the causes of TFP growth are less uniform, although rising ship sizes and load capacity are still dominant forces. Indeed, the increase in ship size contributed even more to the growth on three routes: for Riga and Alexandria they contributed between 76 and 86% of the increase in TFP, and for Bombay about half. The effect along the ENA route decreased only a little, from 30 to 28%. The contribution of improved load capacity was similar to the previous periods, except along the ENA route. Gains from improved fuel efficiency fell between the first and second periods before the War. In the shorter Baltic route, coal consumption still managed to fall due to improvements in engines. In the longer routes like Alexandria and Bombay, however, the tradeoff between coal consumption and ship -25 -size favored the latter. Ship speeds seem to have decreased considerably as well. On the Baltic and Bombay routes, increased ship sizes led to increases in port turnaround times. On the other routes, it seems that ports were able to keep up with the demands placed upon them by larger ships carrying larger loads. Labor savings did not contribute prominently to TFP growth.
The results for the period immediately before the First World War suggest explanations for the discrepancy between the ENA and Alexandria interwar TFP growth (Table 5 ). Perhaps the port of Alexandria could not keep up with increasing ship size. Improvements in steam engine technology had slowed down by the First World War, and as we have seen, even before the War, steam technology could not keep up with increased ship sizes on some routes. The new diesel technology held promise, but British ship owners were slow in adopting the more efficient diesel engine for reasons that are hotly debated in the shipping history literature. Griffiths (1995: p. 318) has drawn a connection between negative perceptions of the diesel engines by many industry leaders and their sympathies for the faltering giant coaling industry. He notes that industry leaders believed that British domination of long-range coal exports contributed significantly to its prewar dominance in long distance shipping. Griffiths than argues that prior dependence on cheap coal freights led to a slow adoption of diesel technology. If Griffith's argument is correct, ship owners on the ENA route would let go of their old ways more easily since that route was less dependent upon the transportation of coal (Harley 1972: p. 318) . Tramp ships along the ENA route had to compete fiercely with liner companies for freights on bulk commodities. These conditions, not prevalent elsewhere, may have forced ship owners on the ENA route to adopt faster and larger ships as well as diesel engine technology.
The big gap between the lower TFP growth rates over the years 1923/5 to 1932/4 and the higher rates over the longer period 1909/11 to 1932/4 need explanation. The discrepancy implies that the First World War saw very sharp increases in TFP growth, and that these transitory rates were not only unsustainable, but even reversed in the interwar period. Sturmey (1962: p. 51) informs us that war profits in tramp shipping were high, even taking into account higher -26 -insurance and replacement costs. The need for quick delivery of war material implied a push for fast turnaround times, a price the market was willing to pay in a wartime cost-plus environment.
Faster and larger ships would also have minimized the time spent at sea exposed to enemy attack and to maximize the amount that could be carried per journey. The ship's capacity would also be pressed beyond free-market optimal levels during wartime when governments were willing to pay very high prices for the fastest delivery possible. The influx of speculative capital (Sturmey 1962: p. 53) would have allowed ship owners to purchase more advanced steam technology, when previously they had opted for less advanced but cheaper ships. The collapse of speculative profits at the end of the war, and in the decline of global trade in the interwar period reversed the productivity advances of the war period. With the break in ship prices in 1920, British ship owners over-invested in second-hand ships, hoping that the boom in freights would continue (Sturmey 1962: p. 58 ). The interwar period was "troubled" (Sturmey 1962: pp. 61-97) by idle tonnage. These low-capacity handicaps were imposed by nationalistic policies of foreign competitors, by the inability of British ship owners to take advantage of new trades --such as tankers, and by their inability to exploit new technologies --such as diesel engines, either due to lack of capital or to technological conservatism.
V. Conclusion
Revisiting the Isserlis index confirms that nominal and real tramp shipping freights did fall drastically in the period between 1869 and 1913. Indeed, the Isserlis index understates the fall in freight rates in both this and the interwar period. However, our new Global Index masks wide regional variation in the behavior of freight rates in the age of steam. Differences can be explained by joint production of shipping freights, among journey-legs and commodities carried on routes. Freight rates did fall globally, but the magnitude and timing depended on these routespecific factors. They did not just depend on distance.
Linking our Global Index with David Hummels' (1999) research on post-Second World War shipping, we are able for the first time to take a long-run view of oceanic transport costs. The decline in nominal freight rates in the pre-First World War period slowed down in the interwar period, and actually reversed after the Second World War. Hummels (1999) has shown that even though real freights fall sharply over the half century following 1950 when deflated by a GDP deflator, commodity-deflated real freight rates hardly fall at all. In short, the fall in real freight rates during the age of steam has not been matched in the century since.
Our TFP calculations, explicitly taking into account joint-production, corroborate the results of previous research and confirm that the decline in global freight rates was not driven just Not all types of technological change in the shipping industry were equal in their impact.
Nor did these changes have a uniform impact across routes. Ship-owners tried to balance the tradeoff between increasing ship size and capacity, increased speeds, lower coal consumption and smaller crew sizes, and route-specific factors determined their decisions. Port turnaround times affected TFP growth as well, and not always positively, since some ports were not always able to keep up with increasing ship size, increasing ship capacity, and trade volume. The literature on the port development and costs is virtually non-existent, and it needs attention.
While David Hummels has examined the post-World War II period in some detail, we feel that more work needs to be done on the interwar period. While the interwar years saw a slowdown in TFP growth in British tramp shipping, the paucity of compiled data on factor costs and quantities has limited our ability to examine the causes of the slow down. Why British tramp -28 -shipping -for so long at the forefront of technological innovation -failed to embrace the emerging diesel technology in this period is a question that requires further examination. If the rapid fall in shipping costs, whose causes we have examined here, lies at the heart of pre-First
World War globalization, then the interwar deceleration in the fall of freight rates can perhaps help shed more light on the contrasting interwar retreat from globalization. 
